In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to V.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., I.C., D.C.,
C.C., E.C., J.C., and A.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0038
FILED 07-23-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD534188
The Honorable Ronee Korbin Steiner, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Ingeet P. Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.C., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶1 Sandra M. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her
parental rights to seven of her biological children on substance abuse and
time-in-care grounds. Mother argues the Department of Child Safety (DCS)
did not make diligent reunification efforts and that termination was not in
the best interests of one of her children. Because Mother has shown no
reversible error, the order is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of V.C., I.C., D.C., C.C., E.C.,
J.C., and A.C. Both before and during the dependency proceedings, Mother
has struggled with substance abuse, at one point admitting to using
fentanyl every other day for an extended period of time. Father of the five
eldest children passed away in 2017. The father of J.C. and A.C. had his
parental rights terminated and is not a part of this appeal. In May 2021, DCS
received a report that, in the presence of V.C., Mother’s significant other
shot three rounds from his gun into the air during a disagreement. The
police were called and both Mother and her significant other were arrested
for possession of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia.

¶3 In July 2021, DCS took temporary custody of the children and
filed a dependency petition alleging, as to Mother, neglect, ongoing
substance abuse, and history of domestic violence. During the dependency
proceedings, in October 2021, Mother tested positive for fentanyl after J.C.
was born. A.C. was born exposed to fentanyl in November 2022. J.C. and
A.C. had been placed in foster care while I.C. and the remaining four
children were in familial placements. The court found the children
dependent as to Mother in February 2022, adopting a family reunification
case plan and ordering services.

¶4 During the dependency, DCS offered Mother various
reunification services, including case management, parenting classes,
parenting time, substance abuse treatment, drug testing, and
transportation. Mother minimally engaged in these services. She did not
drug test, and her referrals for substance abuse treatment through Terros
and supervised visitation through the Nurturing Parent Program (NPP)
lapsed when she failed to participate. DCS renewed Mother’s referrals to
each service many times to no avail; services were repeatedly suspended
given Mother’s failure to participate.

¶5 In November 2023, after the dependency had been pending
for more than two years, the superior court changed the case plan to
severance and adoption. DCS moved to terminate alleging substance abuse

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Decision of the Court

and time-in-care statutory grounds, also alleging that termination was in
the best interests of the children. The court held a one-day termination
adjudication in February 2024, where Mother and others testified. The DCS
case manager testified to the services provided to Mother and her failure to
engage in, and benefit from, those services. Mother contended DCS failed
to make a diligent effort to provide her appropriate reunification services
and asserted that she was managing her substance abuse through
methadone treatments.

¶6 Later in February 2024, after taking the matter under
advisement, the court granted the motion to terminate. The court found
DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds
alleged, and by a preponderance of the evidence that termination was in
the best interests of the children. The court also found DCS made reasonable
and diligent efforts to provide Mother with appropriate reunification
services. This court has jurisdiction over Mother’s timely appeal pursuant
to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and Ariz. Rev. Stat.
(A.R.S.) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-2101(A) and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
601-03 (2024).1

DISCUSSION

¶7 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights a court must
find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground
articulated in A.R.S. 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the
child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court
“is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts,” this court will affirm
an order terminating parental rights as long as it is supported by reasonable
evidence. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App.
2009) (citation omitted).

I. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Finding DCS Made a Diligent
Effort to Provide Appropriate Reunification Services.

¶8 Mother argues the superior court erred in finding DCS made
a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services, one of the
four required showings for termination based on 15-months time-in-care.

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.

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See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). The court must “consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether DCS has made diligent efforts.”
Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 49 (App. 2019). At a
minimum, DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-
home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of
success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-
care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make
reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves
difficult.” Id. at 23 ¶ 50 (citation omitted).

¶9 As noted long ago, this obligation requires DCS to provide a
parent with services and “the time and opportunity to participate in
programs designed to help her become an effective parent.” Maricopa Cnty.
Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). However, DCS “is
not required to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent
participates in each service it offers.” Id. “The purpose of providing
reunification services is to afford a parent ‘the time and opportunity to
participate in programs designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for
the child.’ Such efforts also enable [DCS] to evaluate a parent’s progress, or
lack thereof, toward making reunification possible.” Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at
94 ¶ 31 (internal citation omitted). The record supports the court’s finding
that DCS made a diligent effort to provide Mother with appropriate
reunification services. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8) (“That the child is being
cared for in an out-of-home placement under the supervision of the juvenile
court, the division or a licensed child welfare agency, that the agency
responsible for the care of the child has made a diligent effort to provide
appropriate reunification services and that one of the following
circumstances exist.”)

¶10 From July 2021 to February 2024 -- more than two and a half
years -- DCS offered Mother supervised visits and case-management
services to help her participate in, and benefit from, services. DCS also
referred Mother to Terros for substance abuse treatment, to another entity
for drug testing, to NPP for education and parenting skills, and for domestic
violence counseling. On appeal, Mother argues the services were
inadequate because “DCS (1) failed to provide visitation during a portion
of the reunification attempt, (2) failed to help mother obtain domestic-
violence counseling during a portion of the reunification attempt, and (3)
failed to verify or request documentation of housing and employment.” She
argues that “DCS withheld visitation during a portion of the reunification
attempt simply because a contractor was not available to supervise
visitation” and that “reasonable evidence does not support the court’s

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Decision of the Court

conclusion that DCS made a diligent effort to reunify Mother with her
children.” The trial record shows otherwise.

¶11 The DCS case manager testified that “[she] emailed [Mother
domestic violence service] information several times, [] offered to call
together when [she] was in person. [And] [] gave her several resources,
including Chicanos Por La Causa.” Despite claiming she engaged in
domestic violence counseling, there was no evidence that Mother contacted
Chicanos Por La Causa or engaged in services. A prior DCS case manager
testified that Mother did not provide DCS documentation of stable
employment, nor did she allow DCS to assess her living situation. Mother
also failed to engage in other services provided by DCS. Among other
things, the trial evidence shows Mother missed more than a dozen drug
tests between late September 2023, and late January 2024, and tested
positive for fentanyl as recently as early December 2023.

¶12 Other testimony regarding Mother’s chronic addiction to
fentanyl and lack of participation in services properly supported the court’s
conclusion that “[Mother] has not established any period of sobriety
through testing,” “she has also failed to complete domestic violence
counseling, closed out of prior referrals for parenting classes, and has not
provided proof of stable housing or income.” Despite Mother’s last-minute
effort to engage in services just before the severance trial, the court further
found that “there is a substantial likelihood Mother will not be capable of
exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near future.”

¶13 For more than two and a half years, DCS offered Mother
numerous services, including five referrals to Terros substance abuse
treatment, eight referrals to parent-aide services through the NPP, four
referrals for a case aide and nine referrals for supervised visits. Despite
these services, Mother asserts that “DCS failed to provide specific,
necessary services.” The trial record, however, shows DCS provided
Mother ample opportunities to engage in reunification efforts. Moreover,
DCS is “not required to . . . ensure that a parent participates in each service
it offers.” Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. at 353. On this record, the court
properly could find DCS made a diligent effort to provide appropriate
reunification services and that “Mother has failed to engage in those
services in a meaningful way.” Thus, Mother has not shown DCS failed to
make diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services or that
the court erred in finding that DCS had provided appropriate services.

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II. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Finding Termination Was in
I.C.’s Best Interests.

¶14 Mother argues that the superior court abused its discretion in
finding that termination was in the best interests of I.C. “Termination is in
the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance;
or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). Courts “must consider the totality
of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,
including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.”
Id. at 148 ¶ 1.

¶15 The superior court found the children would benefit from
termination because “it would further the plan of adoption, which would
provide the children with permanency and stability.” As to I.C., the
superior court noted that termination was in the best interests of the child
because “Mother would not be able to tend to [I.C’s] behavioral and mental
health needs at this time or any time in the near future.” On appeal,
Mother’s argument focuses on the fact that “DCS had [not] (1) found
anyone willing and able to adopt I.C., or (2) could do so within a
meaningful period of time.” However, the superior court found that I.C. is
adoptable as defined in Titus S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 365, 370-71
¶¶ 19-24 (App. 2018). “It is well established in state-initiated cases that the
child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests
finding.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13 (2018) (quoting Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016)). Trial evidence supports the finding
that I.C. would benefit from termination because she is currently in a
placement that is able to provide for both her basic needs and special needs
and is “adoptable.” For these reasons, Mother has not shown the court
abused its discretion in finding that severance is in I.C.’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶16 The order terminating Mother’s parental rights to V.C., I.C.,
D.C., C.C., E.C., J.C., and A.C. is affirmed.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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